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 For many, the story of World War 2 is a war that centers on Europe and the destruction of 
the Third Reich and Adolf Hitler. The European Theater included iconic moments and battles 
such as D-Day and the Battle of the Bulge. It also set the stage for another conflict only a few 
years after the V-E Day as the United States and West ostracized the Soviet Union and the East; 
this was evident in the German city of Berlin where the city split into halves based on who 
controlled the part of the city. Europe is also an international center of politics and commerce 
and as a player on the current world stage, people tend to place more emphasis on the European 
Theater when thinking of the Second World War, primarily because of how today dictates 
historical memory. 
While the fighting in Europe is significant, for good reason, the war in the Pacific 
included some of the most brutal ground fighting, large changes in naval warfare and the 
dropping of the only two atomic bombs used in warfare in human history. The success of the 
United States in the Pacific hinged primarily on new naval tactics, especially because of the 
advent of the aircraft carrier and the usage of planes in naval battle. If it were not for the 
adaptation of naval warfare and the success of new naval tactics, specifically the utilization of 
the aircraft carrier, the Pacific could have very easily become the possession of the Japanese.  
When the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, much of the Pacific Fleet 
was decimated. The day of the attacks the Japanese Ambassador gave to the United States 
Secretary of State a message declaring that all negotiations between the two nations were done. 
The message continued on to say that Japan planned to continue to establish their new order 
East, including parts of the Pacific Ocean where, that day, they had already staged massive 
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operations, attacking Americans not only in Hawaii, but also the Philippines.1 At this point, it 
became evident that the Pacific was going to need to be secured and it would take a reworking of 
old naval tactics in order to be successful in the war against the Empire of Japan.  
One of the major tactical changes of the United States Navy was the switch to the carrier-
based fleet. The transition from a battleship-based fleet to a carrier-based fleet was not 
something that occurred overnight. In fact, when the complete fleet became available for use in 
1943, there was already the beginning of an integration of the old and new, “drawing on existing 
doctrine where that made sense and creating new doctrine where that was called for.”2 This 
change in doctrine by the US Navy in the Second World War has set the standard for future 
warfare, and is similar to what is seen today.  
Even in its infancy, it was obvious that the biggest advantage a carrier-based fleet 
provided is the ability to not only control expanses of ocean, but also areas of airspace and 
potentially enemy territory by forming air superiority with these floating cities. Prewar, as these 
ships were just being recognized as valuable for the fleet, the doctrine focused on groups with 
only one carrier. However, in 1942, it became evident that when carrier forces worked “in 
concert,” the results were even greater.3 This would lead to complicated and coordinated attacks 
on the Japanese that would cause massive damage to ships, bases and even cities on the home 
island as the war went on. However, it would take a period of time of working out problems for 
these attacks to become as successful as they were.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Empire	  of	  Japan,	  "Japanese	  Note	  to	  the	  United	  States	  United	  States	  December	  7,	  1941."Avalon	  Project,	  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/p3.asp.	  (accessed	  November	  17,	  2014).	  	  
2 Hone,	  Thomas	  C.,	  "Replacing	  Battleships	  with	  Aircraft	  Carriers	  in	  WWII."	  Naval	  War	  
College	  Review	  63,	  no.	  1	  (2013):	  56.	  	  
3 Tillman,	  Barrett.	  "Fighting	  the	  Carrier	  War."	  Naval	  History,	  October	  2010:	  28.	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Carriers had their place in the war in Europe, but were not focused on as the center of 
many fleets. In fact, they usually were part of submarine hunting operations and escort missions. 
While incredibly slow, they provided enough support and protection to convoys to prevent many 
attacks by German U-boats. The ships also participated in the Mediterranean as supports for 
landings in Morocco and North Africa. They also helped with bombing runs over France, with 
Hellcats making strafing runs over the Riviera.4 While serving in a much glamorous role, and not 
taking a headline in the European theater, the carriers were incredibly important, but served in a 
much different role.  
Before 1943, the carriers were expected to primarily help with three different types of 
missions: raids, ambushes, and covering invasion forces. These tasks were preformed by these 
ships well and were successful in many instances. However, in places like Guadalcanal, success 
came at high prices and provided opportunities for the leadership to learn and adjust the strategy 
of using carriers. One major problem was that until 1943, there was a lack of a cohesive and 
comprehensive doctrine for aircraft carriers. This proved to be problematic in places early in the 
war when leadership changed on a relatively regular basis and information and tactics were 
exchanged very rarely. This lack of exchange of information set the leadership up for problems, 
as when new people came on, they had to relearn lessons in battle that others had already figured 
out and solved. This would also prove to be an issue when carriers grouped together to form 
large task forces. The ability to work in large groups without interfering with other ships would 
be critical in the midst of battle when things can potentially become hazy.5 On top of that, the 
whole task force in general needed new doctrinal changes. While the cruxes of the task forces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Barrett	  Tillman,	  "The	  Carrier	  Comes	  of	  Age,"	  Naval	  History,	  2010:	  27.	  	  5	  Hone,	  “Replacing	  Battleships,”	  61.	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were the carriers many other types of ships accompanied them in their groupings. Destroyers, 
battleships, cruisers, and submarines all helped make up one task force. Experiments took place 
at Pearl Harbor with combinations of carriers and other ships and eventually the commanders put 
together what was one of the most important doctrines in the Pacific war, if not the entire war 
itself, PAC-10. This new doctrine covered everything. From single carrier task forces to 
multicarrier forces to amphibious assault forces, the doctrine outlined protocol all while 
integrating in the rest of the ships in the fleet.   
Another part of the new doctrine that was helped by the carrier based fleet is that it could 
take the battle to the ground and help with raids and provide support. What became evident was 
that in order to have success, was that there was a necessity to be able to split into smaller groups 
and be able to get to the fight. This was seen by using small fleets centered with a carrier and 
surrounded by fast battleships to help provide coverage. This new tactic allowed multiple places 
to be targeted at once. 
A key to making sure carrier fleets succeeded was the use of intelligence gathering planes 
to find enemy ships. Because of the mobility of these bases, and the reach of the planes housed in 
them, being the first one to strike could make the difference in sinking the other ships or being 
sunk. This was shown to be the case at the Battle of Midway. This battle was one of the first 
naval battles where the ships from with side never saw each other. The Japanese had seen some 
success against the United States Navy at this point and were trying to potentially put them away 
for good. However, that did not end up being the case. The Japanese navy was looking to incite 
conflict and because of that, had to make a conflict for the United States seem like something 
that potentially winnable without it actually being so. The U.S., however, had obtained 
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information of all this and were prepared for this battle. The ability to break codes and then act 
on information allowed the United States to strike first which, in the end resulted in a victory.6 
The naval battle at Guadalcanal provided the United States Navy another opportunity to 
show the usefulness of their new super-weapon. By the time the battle between navies occurred, 
the land campaign by Allied forces is well underway and Japan is trying to dislodge the Allies 
off the island and retake Henderson Field. Most of these battles occurred at night, which 
provided the Japanese, who had a system for night fighting, a large advantage and thus caused 
many casualties for the Americans. However, superior American intelligence, along with the 
large amount of aircraft that the U.S. possessed because of the carriers present and the airfield on 
the island, helped wear down the Japanese and eventually solidify the United States as the major 
power over the island. This lead to being able to implement the island hopping strategy from the 
base, which helped set up many more attacks in the Pacific. Once again, carriers became a game-
changer in the midst of the battle and worked well in unison with other military facets. 7 
As the war continued it was crucial to continue to update the carrier to be sure it 
performed at its max ability. The Essex-class was the advancement in carrier technology. These 
ships were not only massive; being able to hold more planes, but were also fast. The planes on 
these ships included torpedo-bombers, Hellcat fighters, and a new generation of tailhook aircraft, 
which allowed for amphibious landings and assaults that would have not been possible to land-
based planes because of distances between targets.8 These planes were crucial because it allowed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Levy,	  James	  P.	  "WAS	  THERE	  SOMETHING	  UNIQUE	  TO	  THE	  JAPANESE	  THAT	  LOST	  THEM	  THE	  BATTLE	  OF	  MIDWAY?"	  Naval	  War	  College	  Review	  67,	  no.	  1	  (2014):	  121.	  	  7	  Mahnken,	  Thomas.	  "Asymmetric	  Warfare	  at	  Sea."	  Naval	  War	  College	  Review	  64,	  no.	  1	  (2011):	  106.	  	  8	  Tillman,	  “The	  Carrier	  Comes	  of	  Age,”	  23.	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the island-hopping strategy to be successful when it otherwise would have not been. For assaults, 
the navy relied much more on their light-class carriers. These were converted Essex carriers with 
lighter hulls. While they could perform most of the same tasks, the amount of planes on one of 
these ships was only about one-third of what was on a normal sized ship. What they lacked in 
amount of planes and other weapons, it made up for in speed and maneuverability. These new, 
lighter hull carriers worked fantastically with the larger, Essex-class and lead many offensives 
across the Pacific, including the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. During the entire span of the war, 
only one light carrier was sunk.9 
 Operation GALVANIC showed how the combined use of carrier working along with 
smaller ships could control amphibious assaults. This was implemented in the Gilbert Islands on 
the atolls of Tarawa, Mankin, and Abemama. Using the reconnaissance that was afforded to the 
navy by the planes from the carriers, they set their sights on these small islands. The command 
also split the battleships up between carrier fleets to stay prepared for any counter attacks  and 
also potentially provide battle-line support for the islands if needed. This would help augment 
the amphibious assault that occurred as well as the air cover that came with it. The tempo of 
attacks that led to the assaults on the Gilberts kept the Japanese on their toes and guessing where 
the next attack would be. Because of this, when it was time for the raid, there was not much of 
preparation for an American attack on the atolls. While the fighting was intense for these small 
specks of land in the ocean, the American Navy helped make these battles shorter.10 According 
to Norman Hatch, a cinematographer who served with Marines on the island the battle was short 
and intense. “Tarawa lasted 76 hours, over 6,000 people were killed – about 5,000 of those were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ibid.	  
10	  Hone,	  Trent.	  "US	  Navy	  Surface	  Battle	  Doctrine	  and	  Victory	  in	  the	  Pacific."	  Naval	  War	  
College	  Review	  62,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  76.	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Japanese – and over 1,000 wounded, all on an island about one third the size of Central Park in 
New York. There was a lot of lead flying around in those 76 hours.”11 Hatch, who served 
throughout World War Two in the Pacific, covered many different battles including Tarawa and 
Iwo Jima saw first-hand just how useful the reinforcements were provided by the carrier fleets. 
Armed with only a camera, and in the middle of the raging battle, Norman recorded the carnage 
of the fight, but also the success of the Second Marines. In an interview with Marsha Orgeron, a 
professor at North Carolina State University, Hatch talks about his memories in the amphibious 
tractors as they descended onto the island. 12 
Amphibious assaults played a large part in the new strategy of the Second World War. 
Because of the need quickly attack and in multiple areas, the ability to get from water to ground 
and back out to sea was vital. One instance of this being used and working well is during the 
Battle of Saipan in June and July of 1944. This battle, which ended in a victory for the 
Americans, relied heavily, especially in the beginning, on amphibious tractors and tanks to not 
only bring the battle from the water to land, but also with getting much needed supplies to the 
troops on the island.13  
For the United States, these tactics were crucial, but communication between the many 
commanders proved to be one of the hinges on which battles were won or lost as well. In the 
Pacific, command fell to two people, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Hatch,	  Norman,	  interview	  by	  Marsha	  Orgeron.	  Filming	  The	  Marines	  In	  The	  Pacific:	  An	  
Interview	  With	  World	  War	  II	  Cinematographer	  Norman	  Hatch.	  (2008):	  164.	  	  12	  Ibid.	  	  13	  Gugeler,	  Russell	  A.	  "ARMY	  AMPHIBIAN	  TRACTOR	  AND	  TANK	  BATTALIONS	  IN	  THE	  BATTLE	  OF	  SAIPAN	  15	  JUNE-­‐9	  JULY	  1944."	  Army	  History.	  http://www.history.army.mil/documents/WWII/amsai/amsai.htm	  (accessed	  November	  12,	  2014).	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Both men were incredibly powerful and had many supporters in D.C. Because of this, there was 
never a clear unity of the command in the Pacific and was the root of many grievances from both 
sides.14 While this is cited as one major difference between the different theaters of war, Europe 
had the same problem. In fact, there were more zones in the European theater where there was 
disconnect in the unity of command than there were in the Pacific. The ability to work around 
breakdowns in communication and strategy between the two leaders was critical. If that does not 
happen, the Pacific would surely have fallen to the Japanese.  
Nimitz, who would later have a class of carriers named after him, was able to work 
around these problems with not only multiple commanders, but the multitude of leaders in his 
own group. Before PAC-10 was put into hands of the sailors, this lack of communication and 
structure was detrimental to the war effort and potentially disastrous. Once a uniform set of 
instructions was put into the hands of Nimitz’s men, however, there was a dramatic shift in the 
effectiveness of how the carrier fleets were operated.15 
It was not only the United States who had plans on switching to a carrier-based navy. 
Japan, whose navy was flexing its muscle as it made grabs for many key islands in the Pacific, 
utilized its integration of battleship fleets and carriers to control vast areas of the Ocean. Carriers 
also played a pivotal role in the attacks on Pearl Harbor as they allowed Japanese fighters to get 
in range to makes the runs. This attack was the first time in history where six carriers were used 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Meilinger,	  Phillip	  S.	  "Unity	  of	  Command	  in	  the	  Pacific	  During	  World	  War	  II."	  Joint	  Force	  
Quarterly	  ,	  2010:	  152.	  	  15	  Hone,	  “Replacing	  Battleships,”	  63.	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as part as one strike force. According to John Lundstrom, this move was unprecedented and was 
“a kind of 1941 atomic bomb.”16  
Japan also was on the cutting-edge of technology gaining equipment such as radar at the 
same time, if not earlier as the United States. One thing that separated the armies was the gap in 
intelligence gathering. The United States was able to be much more efficient with the gathering 
of intelligence on the whereabouts of carriers and task forces that belonged to the Japanese. 
While U.S. committed many gaffes when it came to gathering information, the fact remains that 
the United States was able to beat Japan to the punch in many situations or surprise the Japanese 
Navy with their attacks that resulted in battles won that could have gone either way. The 
persistence of the United States forced Japan to shift their thinking in battle and moved to 
kamikaze-based attacks which forced the United States to adapt their carrier strategy.  
The fact that the United States’ carriers were and still are adaptable to the current 
situation is another reason why the appeal was so large. This was especially apparent as the 
battle developed in the Pacific. The makeup of wings in U.S. aircraft changed over the years in 
response to the changes in the way the Japanese fought. As Kamikaze fighters became 
commonplace, the goal was to stuff as many planes onto the ships as possible. The plane changes 
required little to no structural reconfiguration to the hangars on the ships and allowed the Navy 
to respond quickly to this deadly form of attacks.17 
While on the ground in the Pacific, fighting techniques were adapted to the conditions of  
battle, the changes were not nearly as great in the sense of amount of change as the naval warfare 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Tillman,	  “The	  Carrier	  Comes	  of	  Age,”	  22.	  
17	  Friedman,	  Norman.	  "The	  Value	  of	  Modularity."	  U.S.	  Naval	  Institue	  Proceedings	  140,	  no.	  4	  (April	  2014):	  89.	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tactics were. These changes can all be traced back to have roots in the introduction of carriers as 
the center of fleets in the Pacific. The change from battleships as the center of forces as they still 
were in the Atlantic, to carriers drastically changed the outcome of what the war could have been 
against the Japanese and set a precedent for much of the naval warfare that is seen currently. The 
innovations made during the war to upgrade ships based on fighting situations also played a large 
part in the success that was had. The ability to adjust ships and the types of planes that were 
carried with little to no structural changes allowed for a fast turnaround when it came to 
implementing new policies and potentially saved many vessels, especially when the Japanese 
began to send kamikaze fighters. At the end of the day, change was going to be necessary in 
order to win war against the Japanese. That change was the implementation of many new naval 
tactics; the majority were hinged on these new aircraft carriers. If it were not for the new tactics 
put into the place by the navy, particularity those, which involved aircraft carriers, the fight in 
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